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COMMENT 
TROLLS & THE PREEMPTION DILEMMA 
THOMAS S. VASELIOU† 
Patent trolls account for most patent assertions and are often blamed for the 
increased costs of patent litigation. Congress and the courts have tried to wrangle the 
abusive practices of trolls. Through a post-grant review system, Congress tried to 
combat the growing litigation costs by streamlining invalidity challenges. The Supreme 
Court has also tackled the patent-troll problem in seminal remedy and venue cases, 
hampering trolls’ ability to get injunctions and use certain venues. Yet the problem 
persists. Although Congress and federal courts recognize and sometimes try to alleviate 
the patent-troll problem, what can states do to protect small- and medium-sized 
businesses from these pesky trolls? For now, probably nothing. The Federal Circuit, 
through a preemption analysis influenced by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, 
often invalidates state laws that could regulate the problem. Still, states continue to 
try: most states have passed statutes regulating demand letters asserting patent 
infringement. These state anti-patent laws’ goal is to protect companies and consumers 
from patent trolls. Regardless of whether the current state anti-patent laws will 
effectively deter egregious patent-troll behavior, the Federal Circuit’s current 
preemption doctrine doesn’t seem to let states promote a legitimate state interest—
protecting businesses from bad-faith behavior so that the businesses can innovate. 
But is the Federal Circuit properly reading Supreme Court precedent on 
preemption and the Petition Clause? Or are they unnecessarily developing a rigid 
rule to help ex ante patentholder decisionmaking? As this Comment argues, even 
though the Federal Circuit has improperly morphed the Noerr test into conﬂict 
preemption and doesn’t eﬀectively analyze whether Noerr applies to prelitigation 
communication and non-antitrust claims, the Federal Circuit’s results aren’t far oﬀ. 
There’s good reason for petition immunity to apply to prelitigation activity, like 
 
† Articles Editor, Volume 167, University of Pennsylvania Law Review; J.D. 2019, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. in Electrical Engineering, 2016, University of Florida. Many thanks to 
Jeanne Fromer and R. Polk Wagner for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine. 
126 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 167: 125 
demand letters, but the analysis should be separate from conﬂict preemption. It turns 
out that the Supreme Court’s rigid approach to the sham exception is partly to blame. 
This Comment makes three contributions. The ﬁrst contribution is putting a state 
anti-patent law through a full implied-preemption analysis in accordance with 
Supreme Court precedent. The second contribution is giving and applying a proper 
framework to determine whether the Petition Clause applies to prelitigation 
communication and non-antitrust claims. The third contribution is suggesting a 
ﬂexible petitioning-immunity framework that will leave states room to regulate 
patent-troll demand letters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent trolls account for most patent assertions and are often blamed for 
the increased costs of patent litigation. Congress and the courts have tried to 
wrangle the abusive tactics of trolls and their ﬁnancial consequences. 
Congress, in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, tried to combat the 
growing cost of patent-troll litigation. Congress created a post-grant review 
(PGR) system to streamline validity challenges of weak patents.1 It’s unclear 
whether the PGR system is a success; the most popular form of review, inter 
partes review, has been praised, criticized, and even argued unconstitutional.2 
The Supreme Court has also tackled the patent-troll problem. In eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Justice Kennedy, in concurrence,3 directed lower 
courts, when considering whether to grant an injunction, to consider whether 
the plaintiﬀ was a patent troll.4 And in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group 
Brands LLC, the Court curbed patent trolls’ favorite litigation venue: the 
Eastern District of Texas.5 Although Congress and federal courts recognize 
and sometimes try to alleviate the patent-troll problem, can states do 
anything to protect small- and medium-sized businesses from these pesky 
trolls? For now, probably not. The Federal Circuit, through a preemption 
 
1 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2018) (creating and describing the post-grant-review process); id. 
§§ 311–319 (creating and describing the inter partes review process). 
2 Recently, the Supreme Court held that the inter partes review system was constitutional. Oil 
States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018). Two Justices 
disagreed. Id. at 1380 (Roberts, C.J. & Gorsuch, J.,  dissenting). 
3 Justice Kennedy was joined by three other Justices. 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (joined by Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ.). 
4 Id. at 396. 
5 See 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017) (limiting a corporation’s place of residence under the patent 
venue statute); see also Joe Nocera, The Town that Trolls Built, BLOOMBERG: OPINION (May 25, 2017, 
2:41 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-05-25/the-texas-town-that-patent-
trolls-built-j34rlmjc [https://perma.cc/Z6QH-HB8X] (discussing the Eastern District of Texas as a 
favored venue for patent trolls before TC Heartland). 
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analysis inﬂuenced by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, invalidates 
state laws targeting the problem.6 The Federal Circuit requires that the law 
does not punish prelitigation activity unless (1) the litigant’s actions were 
objectively baseless and (2) the litigant had a subjective motivation “to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor, through the 
use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—
as an anticompetitive weapon.”7 This is the same test the Supreme Court uses 
to determine whether petition immunity is pierced. 
Still, states continue to try: most states have recently passed statutes 
regulating demand letters asserting patent infringement.8 Most states 
prohibit “bad faith assertions of patent infringement”9 to protect companies 
and consumers from the abusive practices of “non-practicing entities” (NPEs) 
or “patent assertion entities”—entities that own and enforce patents but do 
not themselves manufacture the patented products.10 These companies are 
infamously known as “patent trolls.”11 The emerging statutes are coined “anti-
patent laws”: state or local laws that weaken patent rights or that make patents 
much harder to sell, license, or enforce.12 States can also interfere with federal 
patent law by granting patent-like rights through statutes that give aﬃrmative 
rights to inventors.13 
Surprisingly, not all patent trolls are problematic. Mark Lemley and 
Douglas Melamed detail the three patent-troll models and their costs.14 First, 
the “lottery-ticket troll,” the “most traditional” troll model, is a company “that 
owns a patent and hopes to strike it big in court” against big players in the 
industry.15 This troll, unlike the others, relies on the quality of its patents, so 
it isn’t exacerbating the bad-faith-assertion-of-patent-infringement problem.16 
Second, the “bottom-feeder troll,” the most common troll model, is a company 
 
6 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1628-38 (2015) 
(noting that if the infringement allegations aren’t objectively baseless, the current Federal Circuit 
doctrine gives patentholders a legal right to lie). 
7 Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) 
(cleaned up); see Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
8 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). 
9 E.g., id. § 4197. 
10 See id. § 4195 (discussing the Vermont statute’s goal of protecting companies and the state’s 
economy as a whole); David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in 
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014) (detailing the various names given to NPEs). 
11 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 10, at 426. 
12 Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 137 (2018). 
13 Id. at 137 & n.9. 
14 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117, 2125-29 (2013). 
15 Id. at 2126. 
16 See id. at 2128 (describing how “lottery-ticket trolls” craft careful litigation strategies around 
patents they genuinely believe to be valuable). 
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“interested in quick, low-value settlements for a variety of patents.”17 This 
troll relies on the enormous cost of litigation to coerce settlement, regardless 
of the quality of their patents or actual infringement.18 Third, “patent-
aggregator trolls” collect patents, creating patent portfolios that are licensed 
out as a bundle.19 This troll depends on the quantity of its owned patents 
rather than their quality.20 The “sheer number[]” of patents in a patent-
aggregator’s portfolio lets this troll “license without litigation because 
defendants are reluctant to challenge an entire portfolio of patents.”21 The 
emerging state statutes are most concerned with the bottom-feeder troll and 
the patent-aggregator troll.22 
Current state anti-patent laws could eﬀectively deter egregious patent-
troll behavior. But the Federal Circuit, through its conﬂict-preemption 
doctrine, often invalidates these laws. In doing so, the Federal Circuit’s 
doctrine seems to prevent states from promoting a legitimate state interest: 
protecting businesses from bad-faith behavior so that they can use the saved 
resources on innovation instead of on litigation and bad licenses. But is the 
Federal Circuit, in these conﬂict-preemption decisions, properly reading 
Supreme Court precedent on preemption and the First Amendment’s 
Petition Clause? Or are they, as scholars have often complained, unnecessarily 
developing a rigid rule to help ex ante patentholder decisionmaking?23 
As this Comment argues, the Federal Circuit has improperly morphed the 
Supreme Court’s petition-immunity test into conﬂict preemption and doesn’t 
eﬀectively analyze whether petition immunity applies to prelitigation 
communication and non-antitrust claims. But the Federal Circuit’s results 
aren’t far oﬀ. There’s good reason for petition immunity to apply to 
prelitigation activity, like demand letters, but the analysis should be separate 
from conﬂict preemption. It turns out that the Supreme Court’s rigid 
approach to the sham exception is partly to blame, at least when applied to 
non-antitrust claims involving prelitigation activity. 
In ﬁve parts, this Comment makes three contributions: 
 
17 Id. at 2126. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 2126-27. 
20 Id. at 2127. 
21 Id. 
22 For an overview of state statutes, see generally Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent 
Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-
guides/patent-progresss-guide-state-patent-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/A3ZY-656H] (last 
updated May 1, 2019). The anti-patent statutes don’t target lottery-ticket trolls because these trolls 
rely on the quality of their patents and are therefore likely legitimately enforcing them. 
23 See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duﬀy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1660-62 (2007) (criticizing the ossiﬁcation of the Federal Circuit’s rigid 
obviousness analysis). 
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1. It puts a state anti-patent law through a full implied-preemption 
analysis in accordance with Supreme Court precedent. 
2. It gives and applies a proper framework to determine whether the 
Petition Clause applies to prelitigation communication and non-
antitrust claims. 
3. It suggests and applies a ﬂexible petitioning-immunity framework 
that will leave states room to regulate patent-troll demand letters 
while still promoting the purposes of the Petition Clause. 
 
Part I describes the emerging anti-patent laws passed by the majority of the 
states. Part II traces the Supreme Court’s intellectual-property preemption 
doctrine and petitioning-immunity doctrine. Part III describes the Federal 
Circuit’s implementation of Supreme Court precedent and how it morphs 
petitioning immunity into conflict preemption. That Part also describes federal 
patent law’s enforcement policy. Part IV evaluates three professors’ approaches 
to intellectual-property preemption before backing Jeanne Fromer’s approach. 
This Part also suggests a proper framework for analyzing the Petition Clause’s 
applicability to demand letters asserting patent infringement and the proper 
level of protection. Ultimately, for non-antitrust claims involving prelitigation 
activity, I suggest a flexible sham test. Part V showcases a stylized example: I 
apply the suggested preemption and petitioning-immunity tests to Vermont’s 
anti-patent statute. 
I. STATE ANTI-PATENT LAWS 
Substantive patent law is exclusively federal. But state law controls several 
aspects of patents, like areas of ownership and enforcement. For example, 
state probate law controls who inherits a patent,24 and state contract law 
controls assignment and licensing of a patent.25 States can even expose a 
patentholder to liability through “unfair competition, interference with 
contract or prospective business advantage, abuse of process, business 
disparagement, and antitrust” claims.26 
Recently, states have asserted more control over patent enforcement. 
States enacted statutes that regulate bad-faith assertions of patent 
infringement, particularly demand letters.27 There are four characteristics of 
 
24 See, e.g., Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Who 
has legal title to a patent is a question of state law.”). 
25 See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008), amended by 
557 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Construction of patent assignment agreements is a matter of state 
contract law.”). 
26 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1589-90 (footnotes omitted). 
27 As of May 2019, 33 states have passed laws outlawing types of patent enforcement. Patent 
Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 22. 
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these emerging state anti-patent statutes: (1) a bond requirement, (2) a 
private right of action, (3) protection of out-of-state recipients, and (4) 
statutory prohibition against ﬁling a bad-faith patent-infringement lawsuit.28 
Most states’ statutory schemes have several of these characteristics.29 
Take Vermont, the anti-patent movement leader. Its scheme exhibits 
three of the characteristics: a bond requirement, a private right of action, 
and a statutory prohibition against filing a bad-faith patent-infringement 
lawsuit.30 Under this scheme, Vermont uses a nonexhaustive multifactor 
balancing test to determine whether a bad-faith assertion of patent 
infringement exists.31 The statute provides several factors to consider as 
evidence of a bad-faith assertion of patent infringement.32 For example, the 
Vermont court considers whether the demand letter lacks the patent number, 
the patentholder’s name and address, and “factual allegations concerning the 
specific areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology 
infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.”33 Another 
factor is whether the patentholder, before sending the demand letter, “fails 
to conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target’s 
products, services, and technology, or such an analysis was done but does not 
identify specific areas in which the products, services, and technology are 
covered by the claims in the patent.”34 
The statute also provides factors to determine whether an entity has made 
a good-faith assertion of patent infringement, although most are just the 
alternatives of the bad-faith factors.35 When a Vermont court ﬁnds that the 
target of a demand letter established a “reasonable likelihood” that the 
patentholder “made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement,” the court 
will require the patentholder to “post a bond in an amount equal to a good 
faith estimate of the target’s costs to litigate the claim and amounts reasonably 
likely to be recovered.”36 
In Vermont, the state Attorney General or a target can enforce the 
statute.37 The potential private remedies consist of equitable relief, damages, 
 
28 Matt Levy, More on State Patent Troll Laws, PATENT PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2015), 
http://www.patentprogress.org/2015/11/19/state-patent-troll-laws-video/ [https://perma.cc/7PYM-9PU8]. 
29 Id. 
30 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4197–4199 (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). 
31 Id. § 4197. 
32 Id. § 4197(b). 
33 Id. § 4197(b)(1). 
34 Id. § 4197(b)(2). 
35 Id. § 4197(c); see infra Part V (analyzing Vermont’s statute under my suggested preemption 
and petitioning-immunity tests). 
36 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4198. 
37 Id. § 4199. 
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costs and fees, and either treble damages or $50,000, whichever is greater.38 
Although Vermont has a geographical limitation for targets of demand letters, 
other states, such as Colorado, don’t.39 Because federal courts have used 
preemption and petitioning immunity to invalidate similar statutes, I turn to 
Supreme Court precedent in those areas. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT ON PREEMPTION AND PETITIONING 
IMMUNITY 
States know about preemption. The Vermont statute’s statement of 
purpose, for example, notes that “Vermont is preempted from passing any law 
that conﬂicts with federal patent law.”40 But are the states actually worried 
about the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence? 
In general, the federal patent laws’ preemption powers come from the 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”41 There are two types of 
preemption: express and implied.42 Unlike copyright law, the Patent Act lacks 
an express preemption provision.43 
Implied preemption itself has two subcategories, ﬁeld and conﬂict 
preemption. The implied-preemption inquiry “is a question of congressional 
intent.”44 The Supreme Court hasn’t used ﬁeld preemption to invalidate a 
state statute with the federal patent laws as the ﬁeld, but two years ago the 
Federal Circuit, for the ﬁrst time, did.45 The Supreme Court, though, has 
invalidated state patent-related statutes using conﬂict preemption.46 
 
38 Id. § 4199(b). 
39 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-12-101 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“Intended 
recipient means a person who purchases, rents, leases, or otherwise obtains a product or service in 
the commercial market that is not for resale in the ordinary business and that is, or later becomes, 
the subject of a patent infringement allegation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
40 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195(a)(3). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause is a rule of priority. 
42 Hrdy, supra note 12, at 190. 
43 See 17 U.S.C. §	301 (2018) (describing the copyright act’s “[p]reemption with respect to other 
laws”); Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law 
to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 335-36 (2008) 
(comparing the two statutes). 
44 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). The distinction between ﬁeld and 
conﬂict preemption in state patent law is explored infra subsections II.A.1–2. 
45 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
46 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154-57 (1989) 
(finding a Florida statute prohibiting duplication of certain unpatented articles through direct 
molding to be preempted). 
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For conﬂict preemption in the intellectual-property context, two other 
constitutional provisions also matter: the Intellectual Property Clause47 and 
the Tenth Amendment.48 The IP Clause, in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, 
empowers Congress to promote the sciences by giving inventors exclusive 
rights to their inventions for a limited time: “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”49 
The IP Clause thus sets “the means and ends to which Congress can legislate 
to protect intellectual property: Congress can act with the goal of promoting 
progress of science and useful arts, using only the means set out therein, of 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to 
their works.”50 The Tenth Amendment, because Congress only has 
enumerated powers, presumably means that states have the power to regulate 
intellectual property outside the means and ends set in the IP Clause: “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”51 
A. Implied Preemption 
1. Conﬂict Preemption 
Conflict preemption “arises when compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”52 
Although the Supreme Court hasn’t recently applied its conflict-preemption test 
to anti-patent laws, the Supreme Court has tackled patent-like statutes. 
In 1964, the Supreme Court, in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.53 
and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiﬀel Co.,54 started patent law’s modern conﬂict-
preemption jurisprudence. These two cases addressed the same issue: 
whether the federal patent laws preempted state unfair-competition laws 
protecting against the copying of unpatented industrial designs.55 In Compco, 
the design was the subject of an invalidated design patent and was rejected 
 
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
48 Id. amend. X. 
49 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
50 Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Eﬀect, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265, 265-66 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013). 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
52 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 
(1983) (cleaned up). 
53 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
54 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
55 Sears, 376 U.S. at 225; Compco, 376 U.S. at 237-38. 
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for a utility patent.56 Similarly, in Sears, the design wasn’t entitled to a design 
or to a utility patent.57 The Supreme Court preempted both statutes because 
the state statutes pilfered the designs from the public domain, where the 
designs “can be copied in every detail by whoever pleases.”58 
Speciﬁcally, the Sears Court reasoned that state patent-like protection 
impermissibly undermined the federal patent law’s novelty and 
nonobviousness standards and its limited grant of exclusive rights: 
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying 
of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be 
to permit the State to block oﬀ from the public something which federal law 
has said belongs to the public. The result would be that while federal law 
grants only [a limited number of years of] protection to genuine inventions, 
States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to 
merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be 
too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.59 
But the Supreme Court was cautious when encroaching onto state powers. 
Indeed, in dicta, the Sears Court signaled to states that the Court didn’t want 
to undermine legitimate state interests in promoting fair trade: “Doubtless a 
State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether 
patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken 
to prevent customers from being misled as to the source . . . .”60 
Ten years later, the Supreme Court again considered conﬂict preemption 
with the federal patent laws. This time, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the 
Court held that state trade secret laws weren’t preempted by federal patent 
law.61 Conﬂict preemption, the Court determined, must consider the 
“purposes and objectives” of patent and trade secret law to determine whether 
they “clash[].”62 The Court articulated three purposes of patent law: (1) to 
provide an incentive for inventors; (2) to induce disclosure of inventions so 
that the public warehouse of knowledge is improved; and (3) to ensure that 
ideas in the public domain stay there.63 
The Court then identiﬁed two main purposes of trade secret law: (1) 
maintaining standards of commercial ethics and (2) encouraging invention.64 
 
56 376 U.S. at 234-35. 
57 376 U.S. at 231. 
58 Compco, 376 U.S. 237-38; accord Sears, 376 U.S. at 226. 
59 376 U.S. at 231-32 (cleaned up). 
60 Id. at 232. 
61 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974). 
62 Id. at 479-80. 
63 Id. at 480-81. 
64 Id. at 481. 
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The Court thought trade secret law might clash with only one purpose of 
patent law: inducing disclosure of inventions.65 Without empirical evidence, 
the Court relied on the laws’ diﬀerent purposes and trade secret law’s weaker 
protection to conclude that there was “no reasonable risk of deterrence from 
patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted 
patents.”66 But the Court recognized that “[i]f a State, through a system of 
protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable 
inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state 
protection,” then the Court would preempt the statute.67 
That Court examined three more things. First, the Court considered the 
state’s interest in regulating business ethics.68 The Court found that state 
eﬀorts to prevent industrial espionage by protecting trade secrets were 
“unchallengeable” because that activity threatens the “fundamental human 
right” of privacy.69 Second, the Court stated that the patent policy of 
encouraging invention isn’t disturbed by an additional incentive to invent.70 
Third, the Court considered history: namely, the fact that “trade secret law 
and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one hundred years” 
while Congress remained silent.71 To this Court, Congress’s silence meant 
that trade secret law was important.72 
Five years later, the Supreme Court tackled a state contract law giving 
patent-like protection. In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., the Court held 
that federal patent law didn’t preempt a state contract law that forced a 
licensee “to pay royalties . . . on sales of articles embodying the [patent 
applicant’s] invention, for so long as the contracting party sells them,” even if 
a patent isn’t granted.73 The contract had a speciﬁc royalty rate that would 
decrease by half if the patent wasn’t issued within ﬁve years.74 The law, the 
Court concluded, didn’t conﬂict with the purposes of patent law identiﬁed in 
Kewanee.75 As in Kewanee, the Court determined that the contract added 
another incentive, which complemented patent law.76 And the Court again 
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emphasized the state’s interest, acknowledging that “[c]ommercial 
agreements traditionally are the domain of state law.”77 
After another decade, the Supreme Court gave their last word on patent 
conﬂict preemption in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.78 There, a 
Florida statute prohibited selling a duplicate of an unpatentable boat hull.79 
The machine in dispute was unpatentable because of the federal patent laws’ 
public-use bar.80 Conflict preemption, the Court reaffirmed, involved analyzing 
the purposes and objectives of the statutes.81 Considering the Florida statute’s 
structure, the Court said that the Florida statute’s purpose wasn’t to prohibit 
unfair competition (concerned with protecting consumers from confusion by 
source) but to induce “the improvement of boat hull designs.”82 
Next, the Court analyzed the federal patent laws’ purposes. But this time 
the Court explicitly addressed the IP Clause. As the Court saw it, the IP 
Clause “reﬂects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stiﬂe competition without any concomitant 
advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”83 The Court also noted 
that the IP Clause is both a grant of power and a limit because “Congress may 
not create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it authorize the 
issuance of patents whose eﬀects are to remove existent knowledge from the 
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”84 
To determine Congress’s eﬀectuated balance, the Court analyzed the 
federal patent laws’ novelty and nonobviousness requirements. To this Court, 
these statutorily enacted requirements show that “the purposes behind the 
Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of either 
that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily 
discerned from publicly available material.”85 So the Court concluded that 
Florida’s patent-like statute undermined Congress’s eﬀectuated balance and 
found troubling the “administrative problems” if states were allowed “to 
create patent-like rights in various products in public circulation.”86 
Besides the three purposes identiﬁed in Kewanee, the Court considered a 
fourth possible purpose—national uniformity. After Kewanee and Aronson, 
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Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has 
“exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals.”87 Congress’s goal was 
“nationwide uniformity in patent law.”88 And like the Kewanee Court, the 
Bonito Boats Court considered history: preemption is “particularly weak where 
Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a ﬁeld of 
federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and 
to tolerate whatever tension there is between them.”89 History didn’t help the 
Florida statute. The statute was preempted.90 
2. Field Preemption 
Under ﬁeld preemption, federal law invalidates state law when there’s a 
“scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room to supplement it.”91 A scheme can be “so 
pervasive” for two reasons: (1) “the federal interest is so dominant” that it 
presumptively precludes any role for state law enforcement, or (2) “the object 
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations 
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.”92 Field preemption is more 
likely “when the federal statute deals with an area that the federal government 
has traditionally controlled.”93 As described in Section III.B, the Supreme 
Court hasn’t used ﬁeld preemption to invalidate a patent-related state statute,  
but the Federal Circuit has.94 
3. Presumption Against Preemption 
In implied preemption, there’s “a reliable canon of interpretation” to 
presume that a federal statute “supplement[s] rather than displace[s] state 
law.”95 In conﬂict preemption, “if federal law neither prohibits nor requires 
what state law forbids, state law prevails.”96 In ﬁeld preemption, when 
Congress has legislated in a ﬁeld traditionally occupied by the states, the 
court “start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
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89 Id. at 166-67 (cleaned up). 
90 Id. at 168. 
91 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 
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and manifest purpose of Congress.”97 In patent-related conﬂict-preemption 
analysis, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have rarely, if ever, 
applied this canon of interpretation. 
4. A Text-Centered Implied-Preemption Approach 
Three members of the current Supreme Court—Justices Thomas, 
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—have grown skeptical of the implied-preemption 
jurisprudence.98 As these justices recently put it, a litigant, for both ﬁeld and 
conﬂict preemption, “must point speciﬁcally to a constitutional text or a 
federal statute that does the displacing or conﬂicts with state law.”99 “So any 
evidence of pre-emptive purpose, whether express or implied, must therefore 
be sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue.”100 But congressional 
intent for conﬂict preemption may be inferred if “a state law . . . makes 
compliance with a federal statute impossible.”101 
B. Petitioning Immunity: Noerr and Its Progeny 
Some have argued that the real source of concern for these anti-patent 
laws is the First Amendment’s Petition Clause.102 The First Amendment says, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”103 
Petitioning immunity evolved in antitrust cases. In Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,104 a trucking company alleged 
antitrust violations for an alleged “vicious, corrupt, and fraudulent” publicity 
campaign by the railroad companies that “had attempted to inﬂuence 
legislation.”105 It was alleged that the campaign “succeeded in persuading the 
Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a measure known as the ‘Fair Truck Bill.’”106 
The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act didn’t extend to actions that 
“inﬂuence the passage or enforcement of laws”107—unless the campaign is a 
 
97 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
98 Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.). This recent trend began with 
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“mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”108 
But the Court, a leading treatise says, didn’t actually apply the Petition 
Clause. Rather, using a constitutional-avoidance-like analysis, the Court held 
that “given the lack of any congressional mandate in the Sherman Act’s 
legislative history to apply the statute to the political activity at issue, it would 
not construe the statute so as to warrant such an application.”109 The First 
Amendment concern existed because it’s important for individuals to inform 
the government of their wants and because that information is valuable.110 
Holding otherwise would “deprive the people of their right to petition in the 
very instances in which that right may be of the most importance to them.”111 
Noerr, however, left open four questions: First, does Noerr apply to judicial 
and administrative proceedings? Second, how broad is the sham exception? 
Third, does Noerr apply to non-antitrust claims? Last, does Noerr apply to 
prelitigation activity?112 The next four subsubsections detail Supreme Court 
precedent and scholarly discussion of these questions while the fifth 
subsection discusses a patent-specific exception to petitioning immunity. 
1. Judicial and Administrative Agencies 
A decade later, the Supreme Court, in California Motor Transportation Co. 
v. Trucking Unlimited,113 answered yes to the ﬁrst question. There, the Court 
held that the same reasons for immunizing conduct trying to inﬂuence 
legislative and executive eﬀorts demanded the same protection for access to 
administrative agencies and courts.114 Later justices and scholars have 
doubted this interpretation of the Petition Clause.115 For example, in Borough 
of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guarnieri, Justices Thomas and Scalia, in 
concurrence, doubted that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected petition.116 
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140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 167: 125 
2. The Sham Exception 
The Supreme Court has elaborated on the sham exception. That 
exception has three relevant aspects: (1) the strength of the legal theory; (2) 
factual misrepresentation; and (3) repetitive ﬁlings. 
The Strength of the Legal Theory. The leading case on the sham exception is 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. 
(PRE).117 There, the defendant alleged an antitrust violation because the 
lawsuit’s only legal theory was frivolous.118 The Court held that there were 
two requirements to pierce Noerr immunity: (1) the litigant’s actions were 
objectively baseless and (2) the litigant had a subjective motivation “to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor, through the 
use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—
as an anticompetitive weapon.”119 
For the majority, Justice Thomas suggested that “probable cause,” from 
the common-law tort of “malicious prosecution,” was the proper standard for 
objective baselessness.120 In other words, a suit isn’t objectively baseless when 
the plaintiﬀ has a “reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] claim 
may be held valid upon adjudication.”121 So the defendant must “disprove the 
challenged lawsuit’s legal viability before the court will entertain evidence of 
the suit’s economic viability.”122 Here the plaintiﬀ brought a copyright-
infringement claim under a legal theory that other circuits had split on.123 
Because the lower circuits’ jurisprudence was unclear, the majority concluded 
that the legal theory wasn’t objectively baseless.124 
Justice Stevens, however, concurred only in the judgment.125 Justice 
Stevens agreed that there must be an objective element but disagreed with 
the majority’s narrow deﬁnition of objective baselessness.126 To Justice 
Stevens, the objective component could be satisﬁed if the lawsuit were 
“objectively unreasonable.”127 Unlike the majority, the objective prong could 
still be satisﬁed when a plaintiﬀ brings a lawsuit with an insigniﬁcant chance 
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of success on the merits.128 Instead, the Court, as Justice Stevens argued, 
should be guided by the distinction between “abusing the judicial process to 
restrain competition and prosecuting a lawsuit that, if successful, will restrain 
competition.”129 A sham should therefore involve a “plaintiﬀ [who] is 
indiﬀerent to the outcome of the litigation itself, but has nevertheless sought 
to impose a collateral harm on the defendant by, for example, impairing his 
credit, abusing the discovery process, or interfering with his access to 
governmental agencies.”130 In essence, the concurrence disagreed with the 
rigidness of the objective component. 
Factual Misrepresentations. In dicta, the PRE majority stated several broad 
conclusions that could implicate claims based on factual misrepresentations.131 
Justice Thomas stated that Noerr protects “objectively reasonable effort[s] to 
litigate”; that Noerr protects lawsuits “reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable 
outcome”; and that a successful lawsuit is a reasonable petition.132 
At least one scholar urges caution. Hovenkamp argues that this dicta 
shouldn’t be read broadly but in the context that it was written.133 Specifically, 
the dicta shouldn’t be applied “to a claim that may be successful but only 
because the underlying factual allegations were false.”134 This follows the 
Court’s footnote deferring the question of fraudulent factual claims: “We need 
not decide here whether and, if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition 
of antitrust liability for a litigant’s fraud or other misrepresentations.”135 
Repetitive Claims. In California Motors, the Court hinted that a single 
successful claim does not immunize repetitive lawsuits: 
Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when 
used in the adjudicatory process. Opponents before agencies or courts often 
think poorly of the other’s tactics, motions, or defenses and may readily call 
them baseless. One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may 
go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which 
leads the factﬁnder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes 
have been abused.136 
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There, the Court still held 40 claims baseless even though another 21 of 
the claims were meritorious.137 The California Motors Court, as Hovenkamp 
explains, seems to require that parties should consider the merits of each 
petition individually.138 
3. Non-Antitrust Claims 
The Supreme Court hasn’t directly answered whether Noerr applies to 
non-antitrust claims. Outside antitrust, the Supreme Court has struggled to 
establish a distinct Petition Clause doctrine, often transplanting Free Speech 
doctrine into their analysis. Paul Gugliuzza uses McDonald v. Smith139 and 
Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guarnieri,140 two cases that intertwine with 
Free Speech doctrine and involve non-antitrust claims, to question Noerr’s 
application outside antitrust.141 
In McDonald, the defendant wrote two letters to the president, with 
allegedly libelous statements, to hinder the plaintiﬀ ’s “prospect of being 
appointed United States Attorney.”142 The Court didn’t hold that Noerr 
granted the defendant immunity because “there is no sound basis for granting 
greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the 
President than other First Amendment expressions.”143 This leads Gugliuzza 
to conclude that McDonald suggests that “the Petition Clause allows state tort 
law room to operate, so long as that state law does not condemn speech that 
is protected by the [Free Speech Clause].”144 In short, states can regulate 
patentholder statements if the statute isn’t preempted or doesn’t violate the 
Free Speech Clause. 
Noerr was also not applied to the union grievance in Guarnieri.145 In that 
case, the plaintiﬀ ﬁled a “union grievance challenging his termination as chief 
of police.”146 The arbitrator ordered the plaintiﬀ ’s reinstatement.147 Then the 
defendants “issued 11 directives” instructing the plaintiﬀ on how to do his 
job.148 The plaintiﬀ sued the borough arguing that the directives were 
impermissible retaliation against his petition, the union grievance.149 The 
 
137 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 204c. 
138 Id. 
139 472 U.S. 479 (1985). 
140 564 U.S. at 382. 
141 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1612-16. 
142 472 U.S. at 480-81. 
143 Id. at 485. 
144 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1613-14. 
145 564 U.S. at 383. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 384. 
2019] Trolls & the Preemption Dilemma 143 
Court refused to apply Noerr because “the Petition Clause is not an 
instrument for public employees to circumvent these legislative enactments 
[federal and state employment regulations] when pursuing claims based on 
ordinary workplace grievances.”150 The Court then analogized to the Free 
Speech Clause’s public-concern test and applied it to the plaintiﬀ ’s claims 
under the Petition Clause.151 From this, Gugliuzza claims that “Noerr has 
limited relevance outside of antitrust law.”152 
Gugliuzza’s reasoning, respectfully, falls short. These Supreme Court 
cases do not show that Noerr always has limited relevance outside antitrust 
law. Rather, these cases show that the proper determination of the doctrinal 
standard outside antitrust is an analysis of the competing interests between 
the federal government, the state government, and the individual to 
determine whether the statute infringes the Constitution.153 
Both McDonald and Guarnieri involved interest balancing. In McDonald, 
the Court balanced the interests underpinning the Free Speech Clause and 
libel suits with an individual’s interest in petitioning the President about a 
potential hire.154 And in Guarnieri, the majority assessed the administrability 
of the standard and the concerns presented by employee grievances.155 Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence in Guarnieri also called for a balance of competing 
interests: “Even where a public employee petitions the government in its 
capacity as sovereign, I would balance the employee’s right to petition the 
sovereign against the government’s interest as an employer in the eﬀective 
and eﬃcient management of its internal aﬀairs.”156 These opinions recognize 
that it’s not the type of claim that changes the level of protection of 
petitioning immunity but the balancing of competing interests. 
That the Court should balance competing interests is also shown by the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of attorney’s fee shifting in patent cases. In 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., the Supreme Court held 
that Noerr immunity didn’t apply to a statute awarding attorney’s fees in 
exceptional cases.157 The Court concluded this after balancing the purpose of 
the Petition Clause, protecting access to the courts, the interest of Congress 
in having fee shifting, and the burden of fee shifting on bringing lawsuits. 
The Supreme Court wrote, “But to the extent that patent suits are similarly 
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protected as acts of petitioning, it is not clear why the shifting of fees in an 
‘exceptional’ case would diminish that right. The threat of antitrust liability (and 
the attendant treble damages [in] 15 U.S.C. § 15),” the Court argued, “far more 
significantly chills the exercise of the right to petition than does the mere 
shifting of attorney’s fees.”158 “In the Noerr-Pennington context,” the Court 
explained, “defendants seek immunity from a judicial declaration that their filing 
of a lawsuit was actually unlawful; here, they seek immunity from a far less onerous 
declaration that they should bear the costs of that lawsuit in exceptional cases.”159 
The balance there called for less protection. As the Court held, the burden 
of paying attorney’s fees in exceptional cases, one that “stands out from others 
with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position 
(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the 
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated,” doesn’t violate the 
Constitution.160 Most importantly, however, the Supreme Court didn’t close 
the door to Noerr immunity’s application outside the antitrust context. 
Although in McDonald, Guarnieri, and Octane Fitness the competing 
interests warranted less protection than Noerr immunity, this doesn’t mean that 
Noerr shouldn’t apply to anti-patent statutes when the relevant interests are 
balanced. To be sure, Gugliuzza correctly observes that McDonald and Guarnieri 
rejected applying Noerr immunity in a non-antitrust context. But Gugliuzza 
lumps anti-patent statues in with those cases without properly analyzing 
whether the Court, through a balancing of interests, should not apply Noerr’s 
strong protection to the conduct burdened by anti-patent statutes. 
4. Prelitigation Activity 
The Supreme Court hasn’t addressed whether Noerr immunity applies to 
prelitigation activity. But most circuits hold that functionally it should.161 And 
Hovenkamp asserts that it’s counterintuitive and unproductive to not include 
prelitigation activity under Noerr immunity.162 Others, however, adhere 
literally to the text.163 
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But if the Petition Clause’s purpose is to protect access to the legal 
decisionmaking process (including the courts), as I later argue, and 
prelitigation communication is a fundamental step in that process, as I also 
argue, then not extending the Petition Clause to those actions allows states 
to undermine the purpose of the Petition Clause. And, as argued in Section 
IV.B, the Constitution’s text does not foreclose its protection. 
5. Walker Process Fraud: Patent-Speciﬁc Exception  
to Petitioning Immunity 
Besides the sham exception, the Supreme Court has explicitly found a 
patent-speciﬁc exception to petition immunity. In Walker Process Equipment, 
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., the Supreme Court held that when 
a patentholder enforces a patent that was obtained by knowingly and willfully 
misrepresenting facts to the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, the 
patentholder isn’t immune to an antitrust claim.164 Like with the sham 
exception, the antitrust elements must still be proven.165 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PREEMPTION, PETITIONING 
IMMUNITY, AND PATENT ENFORCEMENT 
Recall that preemption occurs through either express or implied 
preemption. And recall that the Patent Act lacks an express preemption 
provision.166 Again, implied preemption occurs in two ways: conﬂict and ﬁeld 
preemption. Before late 2017, the Federal Circuit had never invalidated a 
statute by ﬁeld preemption.167 
This Part has three sections. Section A details the Federal Circuit’s 
conﬂict-preemption jurisprudence. Then section B describes the Federal 
Circuit’s only ﬁeld-preemption case. Last, section C discusses the federal 
patent act’s policy on enforcement. 
A. The Journey to a Conﬂict-Preemption Test Inﬂuenced by the Petition Clause 
Since its creation, the Federal Circuit has restricted states’ ability to enact 
anti-patent laws. The Federal Circuit, when facing patent-like laws, has 
adhered to the analysis created by the Supreme Court in Kewanee, Aronson, 
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and Bonito Boats. But for anti-patent cases, the doctrine has shifted from 
analyzing the purposes of the federal patent laws and of the state statute to 
solely analyzing the conduct the statute covers. 
Early on, the Federal Circuit preempted an anti-patent statute that gave 
an additional remedy for conduct that federal patent law already had a remedy 
for. In Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, the Federal Circuit addressed “whether 
the state tort action for abuse of process can be invoked as a remedy for 
inequitable or other unsavory conduct of parties to proceedings in the Patent 
and Trademark Oﬃce.”168 The court preempted the statute because an 
additional state action “would be an inappropriate collateral intrusion on the 
regulatory procedures of the PTO.”169 
Seven years later, the Federal Circuit assessed another statute 
implicating the inequitable-conduct defense. This time the statute survived. 
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed whether 
federal patent laws preempted a state-law tort claim for intentional 
interference with actual and prospective contractual relations that implicated 
the inequitable-conduct defense.170 After concluding that “it [was] difficult 
to fathom” that the tort obstructed the three purposes of federal patent law 
identified in Kewanee, the court held that the federal patent laws didn’t 
preempt the claim.171 Citing Supreme Court precedent, the Dow court 
recognized that “the protection of the integrity of commercial contracts” was 
“traditionally . . . the domain of state law.”172 The majority distinguished this 
state tort claim from the one in Abbott, as this claim required “elements 
entirely different to those required for inequitable conduct before the PTO” 
and allowed for a different remedy.173 
The Federal Circuit, however, then departed from the Supreme Court 
precedent of analyzing the purposes of the statutes and instead focused on 
applying a bad-faith standard to a patentholder’s conduct. In Hunter Douglas, 
Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., the Federal Circuit evaluated the defendant’s 
“allegedly tortious conduct” to determine whether the state tort claim 
provided a remedy for “conduct that is protected or governed by federal 
patent law.”174 Using an as-applied analysis of the state unfair-competition 
law, the court preempted the law because the “federal patent law bars the 
imposition of liability for publicizing a patent in the marketplace unless the 
plaintiﬀ can show that the patentholder acted in bad faith” and “requir[ing] 
 
168 952 F.2d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
169 Id. at 1357. 
170 139 F.3d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
171 Id. at 1475, 1478-79. 
172 Id. at 1475 (cleaned up). 
173 Id. at 1477-78. 
174 153 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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less would impermissibly alter the balance between the competing purposes 
of federal patent law.”175 
This derailment continued. The Federal Circuit, in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. 
Exzec, Inc., affirmed that bad faith was the proper conflict-preemption 
analysis.176 Bad faith, the court said, is a case-by-case analysis and “a prerequisite 
to [an alleged infringer’s] state-law tortious interference claim; without it, the 
claim is preempted by patent law.”177 The court also gave a clear example of bad 
faith: “[I]f the patentee knows that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed, yet represents to the marketplace that a competitor is infringing the 
patent.”178 And the court noted that statements that are impossible to confirm 
in advance, like whether you can design around a patent, are inherently suspect, 
making the bad-faith standard easier to satisfy.179 
Three years later, the Federal Circuit elaborated on actionable bad-faith 
statements in Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc.180 Statements are actionable when 
clear and convincing evidence exists that “the infringement allegations are 
objectively false, and that the patentee made them in bad faith.”181 Bad faith 
required the patentholder to allege infringement “with knowledge of their 
incorrectness or falsity, or disregard for either.”182 
Finally, the Federal Circuit linked the bad-faith standard with Noerr 
immunity in Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.183 In that 
case, the court held that Noerr immunity applied to prelitigation 
communications for two reasons.184 First, several sister circuits held so.185 
Second, not extending the protection to prelitigation activity would be 
anomalous and socially counterproductive.186 In other words, it’s odd that 
someone would be protected if they “strike[] without warning” but not if they 
give notice to the other party, opening the possibility to settlement.187 Thus, 
“[t]he federal patent laws preempt state laws that impose tort liability for a 
patentholder’s good faith conduct in communications asserting infringement 
of its patent and warning about potential litigation,” unless the statute 
satisﬁes the two-part test from PRE.188 
 
175 Id. at 1336-37. 
176 182 F.3d 1340, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 1354. 
179 Id. at 1354-55. 
180 310 F.3d 1374, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
181 Id. at 1371. 
182 Id. 
183 362 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
184 Id. at 1376. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 1376-77. 
187 Id.; accord AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205f. 
188 Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (2004). 
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From the development of conﬂict preemption for anti-patent laws, there 
are three takeaways. One, the inquiry moved from a purpose-based analysis 
of the patent act and the disputed statute to a conduct-based analysis. Two, 
the First Amendment inﬂuenced the Federal Circuit’s doctrine. Three, the 
current analysis is a rigid rule, which is typical of the Federal Circuit.189 
B. Field Preemption 
For the first time in late 2017, the Federal Circuit used field preemption to 
invalidate a state unfair-competition law. In Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., the 
Federal Circuit held that the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act 
(BPCIA) preempted the state-law claims because the BPCIA was a 
“comprehensive, carefully calibrated scheme” that “left no room for the States 
to supplement it.”190 The field-preemption-causing conflict, the Court argued, 
was the different “available remedies between federal and state law.”191 The 
field wasn’t patent law generally but specifically biosimilar patent litigation.192 
Alternatively, the court concluded that there was also conflict preemption.193 
C. Federal Patent Law’s Enforcement Policy 
The Patent Act doesn’t provide damages or injunctive relief for 
patentholder conduct, only invalidation or unenforceability.194 Surprisingly, 
federal patent law hardly mentions enforcement. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) gives 
patentholders the right to “give notice to the public that [their invention] is 
patented.”195 An inventor gives notice by marking an article, by ﬁling for 
infringement, or by other means like demand letters.196 Federal patent law 
also gives several aﬃrmative defenses based on improper conduct by a patent 
owner: misuse, inequitable conduct, and estoppel.197 
In general, patent misuse occurs when a patentholder, through a license, 
imposes conditions that exceed the scope of the patent right.198 When a court 
 
189 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleﬂex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (overturning the Federal 
Circuit’s rigid obviousness test because it conﬂicted with the Court’s previously established 
“expansive and ﬂexible approach”). 
190 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326-28 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). 
191 Id. at 1328. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 1328-30. 
194 Of course, patentholder conduct can lead to increased damages. 
195 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2018). 
196 Id. 
197 See, e.g., id. § 282(b). Before 2017, laches was a defense for improper conduct, but the 
Supreme Court held that laches couldn’t bar claims for damages under 35 U.S.C. § 286. SCA 
Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC., 137 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2017). 
198 Princo Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326-31 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
Patent law provides several patent-misuse exceptions. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). 
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ﬁnds misuse, the court withholds the remedy for infringement or for breach 
of a license agreement until the misuse stops.199 
Inequitable conduct, by contrast, only involves conduct before the Patent 
and Trademark Oﬃce. It requires both proof of a speciﬁc and deliberate 
intent to deceive the PTO and materiality.200 For intent, the patentee must 
know that the reference exists and is material and must deliberately withhold 
the reference.201 For materiality, the Federal Circuit requires a high threshold 
of but-for materiality: a reference is material if the PTO wouldn’t have 
allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed reference.202 The 
Federal Circuit, however, carved out an exception for particularly egregious 
misconduct, such as ﬁling false aﬃdavits or aﬃrmative egregious acts.203 
Last, equitable estoppel occurs “when (1) the patent owner through 
conduct, positive statement, or misleading silence represents to the infringer 
that his business will be unmolested by claims of infringement, and (2) in 
reliance on that representation, the infringer continues or expands his 
business.”204 In short, the federal patent law gives defendants limited actions 
against patentholder conduct. 
Considering these rights, the Federal Circuit declared a general policy 
that patentholders’ good-faith enforcements were immune from liability. In 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the plaintiﬀ manufactured and sold to 
hospitals a patented medical device.205 The device was labeled “Single Use 
Only” and packaged with an insert stating that the medical device was “For 
Single Patient Use Only” and that “the entire contaminated apparatus [must] 
be disposed of in accordance with procedures for the disposal of biohazardous 
waste.”206 Hospitals instead sold the used device to the defendant for 
reconditioning and reuse.207 The Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiﬀ 
could send a notice to its customers that reuse was an infringement because 
the patentholder acted in good faith.208 
Indeed, “[a] patentee that has a good faith belief that its patents are being 
infringed violates no protected right when it so notiﬁes infringers: Patents,” 
wrote the Federal Circuit, “would be of little value if infringers of them could 
not be notiﬁed of the consequences of infringement or proceeded against in 
 
199 6A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2018). 
200 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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203 Id. at 1292. 
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208 Id. at 701, 709. 
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the courts. Such action, considered by itself cannot be said to be illegal.”209 
The court continued: “It is not an actionable wrong for one in good faith to 
make plain to whomsoever that it is his purpose to insist upon what he 
believes to be his legal rights, even though he may misconceive what those 
rights are.”210 The Federal Circuit also gave three examples of punishable bad-
faith infringement notices: (1) making threats without intending to sue; (2) 
sending notices indiscriminately to everyone in the trade; and (3) lacking a 
good-faith belief in the validity of its patent.211 At least outside preemption 
analysis, the Federal Circuit believed that patent policy required 
immunization of good-faith enforcements. 
IV. REASSESSING PREEMPTION & PETITION IMMUNITY 
Section A describes three prior proposals for the proper intellectual-
property preemption analysis. None of these works suggest a framework for 
petition immunity or a change to the sham exception: the proposals either 
clarify the proper conﬂict-preemption analysis under precedent or argue that 
Noerr shouldn’t apply to demand letters. Section B suggests a framework for 
determining the level of protection under the Petition Clause and details the 
proper analysis of the objective requirement for Noerr immunity. 
A. Other Academic Proposals 
There are three relevant proposals on intellectual-property preemption. 
The ﬁrst clariﬁes Supreme Court intellectual-property preemption doctrine 
and creates a framework. The other two address anti-patent laws and suggest 
changes to the Federal Circuit’s preemption and petition-immunity analysis. 
1. The IP Clause as a Guide 
Jeanne Fromer persuasively argues that the IP Clause guides the 
preemption analysis but doesn’t preempt state laws by its own force.212 As 
Fromer asserts, state laws are preempted “on satisfaction of two conditions: 
(1) they lie within the preemptive scope of the IP Clause, and (2) they upset 
the IP Clause’s balance, as eﬀectuated by a federal law.”213 
First, Fromer’s argument requires an important understanding of the IP 
Clause and the structural purpose of the state law. In previous works, Fromer 
argued that “the best understanding of the IP Clause is that it both grants 
 
209 Id. at 709 (cleaned up). 
210 Id. at 710. 
211 Id. 
212 Fromer, supra note 50, at 266. 
213 Id. 
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and limits Congress’s powers to enact intellectual-property protection.”214 As 
she saw it, the purpose of the clause is “encouraging the advancement of 
systematic knowledge, cultural knowledge, and technology.”215 The means 
Congress may use is giving inventors exclusive rights to their inventions for 
a limited time.216 When determining the state law’s purpose, Fromer suggests 
ascertaining it from the law’s structure, not from empirics.217 But “state laws 
that piggyback oﬀ the federal laws passed pursuant to the IP Clause lie within 
its preemptive scope in certain ways, even if they lack structural purpose to 
promote progress of science and useful arts.”218 
Second, to determine whether the state law upsets the statutorily 
implemented balance, the congressional intent of the particular balance 
between inventors and public entitlements must be assessed.219 Then the 
analysis “will typically require an assessment of the eﬀect on this balance by 
the state law at issue both facially and as applied.”220 
Fromer’s framework for Supreme Court precedent is correct. Because, for 
intellectual property, Congress has only the power to promote the sciences 
through a grant of exclusive rights for a limited time to an inventor, states, 
through the Tenth Amendment, have powers to legislate in intellectual 
property. The Supreme Court has even denied, several times, that states lack 
a legitimate interest in regulating intellectual property.221 
And a structural analysis of the state statutes is the most eﬀective 
approach because it shields judges from debating empirics that aren’t likely 
available during the litigation. It also gives states notice and predictability in 
assessing the scope of the IP Clause and whether their statutes will be within 
the IP Clause’s power. Last, Fromer captures the purpose of conﬂict 
preemption in her test: even if the statutes are within Congress’s power, the 
statute still must be a suﬃcient obstacle to federal patent law. Thus, Fromer’s 
two-part framework correctly characterizes Supreme Court precedent and 
should be applied to the state anti-patent laws. 
 
214 Id. at 278 (citing Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012)). 
215 Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, supra note 214, at 1373. 
216 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
217 Fromer, supra note 50, at 279. 
218 Id. at 266. 
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221 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) (“States 
may place limited regulations on the use of unpatented designs in order to prevent consumer 
confusion as to source.”). 
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2. Returning to Equitable Good Faith 
As mentioned, Gugliuzza argues that petition immunity shouldn’t apply 
to demand letters.222 Gugliuzza suggests that the Federal Circuit should bring 
back the malleable good-faith standard rather than equating bad faith with 
Noerr immunity.223 Traditionally, good faith was a “subjective concept: that 
the speaker sincerely believed in the truth of his statement.”224 That test 
therefore opens up the door for “private plaintiﬀs and government law 
enforcers . . . to impose civil liability on unscrupulous patent holders without 
having to take the diﬃcult additional step of disproving the merits of the 
underlying infringement claim.”225 
As discussed in Section II.B., Gugliuzza incorrectly analyzes whether the 
Petition Clause can protect demand letters and what the level of protection 
is. Although his ultimate suggestion—that one of Congress’s intents was to 
protect good-faith enforcements—is correct, he only determines the 
eﬀectuated balance by case law and not through the congressionally enacted 
rights and aﬃrmative defenses in patent law. 
3. The Dormant IP Clause 
Most recently, Camilla Hrdy argues that the true origin of preemption is 
the IP Clause itself and recommends a reasonableness test.226 Hrdy suggests 
returning to the rule in Allen v. Riley,227 where courts “assess whether a 
particular state law unconstitutionally burdens the patent right itself as 
‘secured’ by Congress based on the preemptive eﬀect of the Intellectual 
Property Clause itself.”228 The question is “what does it mean for a state to 
place an ‘unreasonable’ versus a ‘reasonable’ burden on a federal patent right?”229 
To this, she gives two possibilities: (1) a clear ceiling or (2) a 
reasonableness test.230 But Hrdy’s proposed interpretation of the IP Clause 
lacks textual standing.231 Like the Dormant Commerce Clause, the IP Clause 
is only a positive grant. But the excuse the Supreme Court uses to justify the 
Dormant Commerce Clause doesn’t apply to the IP Clause. As the Supreme 
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Court sees it, the fact that “the Commerce Clause by its own force restricts 
state protectionism is deeply rooted in our case law. And without the 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause, we would be left with a constitutional scheme 
that those who framed and ratiﬁed the Constitution would surely ﬁnd 
surprising.”232 The IP Clause, by contrast, lacks the history and established 
case law to warrant inferring a negative aspect. Hrdy also doesn’t credit 
Kewanee and Bonito Boats overruling the early case law.233 
B. Reevaluating Noerr’s Application to Courts and Prelitigation Activity 
1. The Petition Clause’s Scope 
The Petition Clause Applies to Courts. A proper determination of the 
Petition Clause’s original public meaning requires a textual and historical 
analysis. Let’s start with the text.234 The First Amendment says, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”235 There are three key 
deﬁnitions from founding-era dictionaries: 
 
• Petition: “To make a request to; to ask from; to solicit; . . . to 
petition a court of chancery.”236  
• Redress: “To remedy; to repair; to relieve from, and sometimes 
to indemnify for; as, to redress wrongs; to redress injuries; 
to redress grievances. Sovereigns are bound to protect their 
subjects, and redress their grievances.”237 
• Grievance: “That which causes grief or uneasiness; that which 
burdens, oppresses or injures, implying a sense of wrong done, or 
a continued injury, and therefore applied only to the eﬀects of 
human conduct; never to providential evils. The oppressed 
subject has the right to petition for a redress of grievances.”238 
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Put together, this contemporary textual evidence reveals that the Petition 
Clause protects citizens’ requests to the government (including courts) to 
remedy their problems.239 
The text reveals something else: “[t]he reference to ‘the right of the people’ 
indicates that the Petition Clause was intended to codify a pre-existing 
individual right, which means that we must look to historical practice to 
determine its scope.”240 Maggie Blackhawk, in analyzing petitioning from the 
colonists to the Constitutional Convention, concludes that petitioning was “an 
intrinsic part of English political life” and was the “primary means of political 
engagement for the unenfranchised and for collective political activity.”241 
The public’s understanding of the Petition Clause before and after 
ratiﬁcation conﬁrms this.242 Based on a review of 600 petitions to the First 
Congress, Blackhawk determines that Congress plainly “aﬀord[ed] equal, 
formal, and public process to petitioners.”243 Petitions involved mostly private 
concerns but also public concerns, such as requests for patent protection and 
pensions and commentary on slavery.244 Notably, Congress often “referred 
these petitions to the executive or to a congressional committee for review 
and routinely provided each a formal response.”245 Although Blackhawk 
 
239 For a discussion of some shortcomings of Founding-era dictionaries, see Thomas R. Lee & 
James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 283-89 (2019). 
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Blackhawk also discusses legislative history. She contextualizes the First Amendment’s text by analyzing 
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the First Amendment to include a more restrictive right—the right to instruct representatives.” Id. at 
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limiting principle on how the public could engage in the lawmaking process outside of the vote, in order 
to maintain republican principles and those mechanisms of representation carefully designed and 
detailed elsewhere in the Constitution.” Id. at 1152. 
But “[t]he private intent behind a drafter’s rejection of one version of a text is shoddy evidence 
of the public meaning of an altogether diﬀerent text.” Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1965 
(2019); see United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) (“[F]ailed legislative proposals are a 
particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute . . . .” (cleaned 
up)). “Congressional inaction,” the Supreme Court says, “lacks persuasive signiﬁcance because 
several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the 
existing legislation already incorporated the oﬀered change.” Craft, 535 U.S. at 287 (cleaned up). But 
see Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 521 (2001) (“The fact that the proposal was made suggests that its 
proponents thought it necessary, and the fact that it was rejected by a vote of 41 to 10 suggests that 
we should give weight to the views of those who opposed the proposal.” (cleaned up)). 
242 The Supreme Court seems split on the weight of post-enactment history. Recently, Justice 
Alito described the post-enactment history in Heller as only being “treated as mere conﬁrmation of 
what the Court thought had already been established.” Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1976. Justice Scalia in 
Heller, by contrast, categorized post-enactment history as “a critical tool of constitutional 
interpretation.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008). 
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concludes that the “historical right concerned direct engagement with 
government only” and that advocacy outside formal channels isn’t protected 
by the Petition Clause but the Free Speech Clause, her ﬁndings help evaluate 
the competing interests in determining whether the Petition Clause applies 
to these anti-patent statutes.246 
Besides the founding-era dictionaries, history bolsters the claim that the 
Petition Clause should apply to agencies and courts. In analyzing the 
outgrowth of the administrative state, Blackhawk points out that “the petition 
process resembled litigation in a court more closely than the rough and 
tumble public engagement process described by political scientists today. 
Petitioners would submit formal documents, like complaints, to trigger 
petition actions in Congress.”247 By tracking the creation of the administrative 
state from Congress’s perspective, Blackhawk shows that Congress 
transferred jurisdiction over certain petitions when Congress created 
commissions and the Court of Claims.248 In short, the Petition Clause, 
according to Blackhawk, protects a right to equal, formal, and public access 
to the lawmaking process.249 
I, by contrast, read the history as assuring the right to petition the 
government’s legal decisionmaking process (includes the lawmaking process).250 
This reading wouldn’t narrow the scope to the legislative or executive 
functions. Rather, to me, the history and ordinary meaning of petition, redress, 
and grievance support a broader protection, including asking for rights to be 
adjudicated. After all, “[i]t is a settled and invariable principle . . . that every 
right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper 
redress.”251 And the court, according to Chief Justice Marshall, has a role in 
providing redresses.252 It would therefore be passing strange for the 
enactment and enforcement of a law to be protected but not the action that 
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gives the law its “legal eﬀect.”253 And courts do just that, especially when there 
are indeterminacies.254 
But even if you believe that the court makes law,255 then you still will find 
under Blackhawk’s formulation that the Petition Clause’s scope will include 
courts. If the court makes law, then it is no doubt part of the lawmaking process. 
The Petition Clause Applies to Prelitigation Activity. Where Blackhawk and I 
most fundamentally diﬀer is whether the Petition Clause only applies to direct 
interaction with the government. Under Blackhawk’s conception of the 
Petition Clause, prelitigation activity or public campaigns like in Noerr 
wouldn’t be protected by the Petition Clause but by the Free Speech Clause.256 
Courts and scholars have suggested that the First Amendment’s text is an 
insurmountable hurdle to petition immunity applying to prelitigation 
 
253 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1985 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting “the 
power of a court to give legal effect to prior judicial decisions” (quoting Gary Lawson, The Constitutional 
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(emphasis added)); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12 (“[T]o 
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255 Judge Pryor’s and Judge Rosenbaum’s recent clash illustrates the doctrine–law dispute. 
Lester v. United States, 921 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2019). Here’s a taste: 
 
• Judge Pryor: “[W]e should be mindful of the difference between a change in judicial doctrine 
and a change in law. . . . Although Booker radically changed judicial doctrine with respect 
to the Guidelines, neither of its holdings was the equivalent of a legislative or constitutional 
amendment to the substance of the law.” Id. at 1312-14 (Pryor, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
• Judge Rosenbaum: “So while we can pretend that the Supreme Court’s decisions do not 
‘change the law,’ the reality is that in our constitutional system, sometimes they can and 
they do.” Id. at 1333 (Rosenbaum, J.) (internal citations and alterations omitted). 
 
See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 527 (2019). 
And more recently, Judge Haynes clashed with Judges Oldham and Ho on whether federal 
courts make law. Compare Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 591-95 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) 
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power to make, change, or strike down a statute). 
256 Blackhawk, supra note 241, at 1185-86. 
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activity.257 But the text of the Petition Clause does not foreclose protecting 
prelitigation activity. To start, “we must never forget, that it is a constitution 
we are expounding.”258 The goal is a fair reading, not hyperliteralism.259 That 
is why the Second Amendment, surely, protects manufacturing and selling 
ﬁrearms, despite the text only speaking to “keep[ing] and bear[ing] arms.”260 
True, these might not be considered the core of the right, but that doesn’t 
mean they receive no protection, just less protection.261 The same should hold 
true under the Petition Clause for prelitigation activity, as “the right to settle 
generally accompanies the right to litigate in the ﬁrst place.”262 Otherwise, 
states or Congress may heavily regulate indirect activity, stymying direct 
interaction with the courts. 
In short, I think the key question is how much protection the Petition 
Clause should give to prelitigation activity—not whether it’s protected at all. 
As I discussed in Subsection II.A.3, I propose a competing-interests analysis, 
balancing the interests of petitioning the courts, free speech, state governments, 
and the federal government, to determine the level of protection. 
2. How Much Protection: Competing-Interests Analysis 
To determine the proper level of regulation allowed under the Constitution, 
the competing interests should be balanced. Here the ultimate doctrinal 
limitation, however, should promote the purpose of the Petition Clause: access 
to the legal decisionmaking process. The current state anti-patent statutes 
implicate four interests: (1) access to courts; (2) compelled speech; (3) the state 
and federal governments’ legitimate interest in protecting businesses and 
promoting invention; and (4) the individual’s interest in decisionmaking not 
based on false information. The first two interests outweigh the burdens on the 
last two, so demand letters should have heightened protection. 
First, access to courts. Prelitigation communication helps people access 
the courts. Demand letters “provide useful notice and facilitate the resolution 
of controversies.”263 Often, these demand letters result in settlements, 
 
257 See supra note 163. 
258 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); see Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1982 
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260 See David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 230, 230 (2014); see also Josh Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and 3D Printed 
Guns, 81 TENN. L. REV. 479, 491-98 (2014). 
261 This is the case in the scrutiny context. Ass’n of N.J. Riﬂe & Pistol Clubs v. Att’y Gen. 
N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 126 (3d Cir. 2019) (Bibas, J., dissenting) (“[W]e pick a tier of scrutiny based only 
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262 F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 169 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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allowing the “legal system to develop . . . public and private structures that 
allow for the relatively eﬃcient and eﬀective compensation of those harmed 
in mass society.”264 These virtuous functions will be curtailed if the 
government could punish an inherent ﬁrst step in patent-infringement 
lawsuits but not if the patentholder sued ﬁrst. Indeed, in the words of Chief 
Justice Roberts, “the right to settle generally accompanies the right to litigate 
in the ﬁrst place.”265 And punishing the attempt to settle before litigation 
would provide little incentive to do it.266 So a standard only protecting direct 
interaction with the government hurts the Petition Clause’s purpose—access 
to the courts—because litigation costs will increase and because dockets won’t 
be streamlined. Importantly, most states, like Vermont, allow treble damages 
to be awarded.267 The Supreme Court in Octane Fitness found the potential 
for treble damages from antitrust a strong reason for Noerr immunity.268 So 
at least with some anti-patent statutes, the burden on petitioning is high. 
Second, compelled speech. Regulating prelitigation communication can 
cause compelled speech. This strongly implicates free-speech principles, where 
protection is great. Protection of “the First Amendment against state action 
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at 
all.”269 Although outside the scope of this Comment, there’s good reason to 
believe that the compelled-speech doctrine will apply to demand letters.270 
Third, state and federal government’s legitimate interest. States and the 
federal government have an interest in protecting businesses, but the states 
and federal government can still use procedure in litigation to deter this 
behavior. Some scholars have suggested anti-SLAPP methods and fee shifting 
to deal with bad-faith lawsuits.271 As seen in Octane Fitness, the competing 
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268 572 U.S. 545, 555-57 (2014).  
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interests change once the parties are in litigation, letting the government 
regulate the activity more.272 
Last, decisionmaking on false information. An individual’s interest in 
deciding whether to get a license based on accurate information isn’t greatly 
hindered by protecting demand letters. As Hovenkamp argues, making false 
material statements can lead to piercing Noerr immunity.273 Thus, states can 
regulate when the false information is material, so the worst offenses are 
punishable under the Petition Clause.274 To be sure, the current formulation of 
the sham exception creates a near absolute immunity for demand letters. But 
next, I describe a solution that will properly balance the competing interests 
within the two-part test from PRE. In sum, petitioning is best protected by 
strong, but not near absolute, protection of demand letters. 
3. Reevaluating the Noerr Doctrine’s Objective-Baselessness Prong 
PRE created a rigid rule for the objective-baselessness requirement: “no 
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”275 As Justice 
Stevens noted, this rule isn’t workable for complex cases.276 Patent troll 
demand-letter practices are just this complex situation that the current rule 
doesn’t work for. So I propose that the Court adopts Justice Stevens’s flexible 
standard that considers more than the merits of the single claim before the 
Court. This will give states more room to regulate a legitimate state interest in 
protecting businesses from bad-faith assertions of patent infringement while 
still promoting the purpose of the Petition Clause. 
Justice Stevens’s sham test focuses on a “plaintiﬀ [who] is indiﬀerent to 
the outcome of the litigation itself, but has nevertheless sought to impose a 
collateral harm on the defendant by, for example, impairing his credit, 
abusing the discovery process, or interfering with his access to governmental 
agencies.”277 Judge Posner, in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,278 
captures the ﬂexible standard for objective baselessness. Judge Posner 
suggests considering the probability of winning, the remedy, and the cost of 
litigation.279 He also gave examples of objectively unreasonable suits: 
Suppose a monopolist brought a tort action against its single, tiny competitor; 
the action had a colorable basis in law; but in fact the monopolist would never 
 
272 572 U.S. at 557-58. 
273 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205c2. 
274 Of course, this depends on whether the statutes survive conﬂict preemption. 
275 Prof ’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S 49, 60 (1993). 
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have brought the suit—its chances of winning, or the damages it could hope 
to get if it did win, were too small compared to what it would have to spend 
on the litigation—except that it wanted to use pretrial discovery to discover 
its competitor’s trade secrets; or hoped that the competitor would be required 
to make public disclosure of its potential liability in the suit and that this 
disclosure would increase the interest rate that the competitor had to pay for 
bank financing; or just wanted to impose heavy legal costs on the competitor 
in the hope of deterring entry by other firms.280 
Thus, immunity is pierced “when [the party’s] purpose is not to win a 
favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and deter others, 
by the process itself—regardless of outcome—of litigating.”281 Notably, the 
outcome can change because the parties are competitors: “[t]he irrationality 
of pursuing a given claim against a noncompetitor need not transform the 
same claim against a competitor into a sham, even under the position of the 
concurring opinion.”282 Although this analysis—ﬁnding the true purpose of 
the litigation—is diﬃcult, courts already have to do this in other areas of 
law.283 This ﬂexible approach will let states enact statutes directed at bottom-
feeder and patent-aggregator trolls while preserving access to the legal 
decisionmaking process. 
V. STYLIZED EXAMPLE: VERMONT’S PATENT-ENFORCEMENT STATUTE 
For states to combat bad practices of patent trolls, their well-intentioned 
anti-patent statutes must survive conﬂict preemption, ﬁeld preemption, and 
petition immunity. The three analyses are separate, as the focus of conﬂict 
and ﬁeld preemption is the federal patent laws while petition immunity’s 
source is the First Amendment incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This Part has three sections. Section A recounts the story of MPHJ 
Technology Investments, an infamous bottom-feeder patent troll.284 Section 
B uses Fromer’s proper understanding of the Supreme Court’s conﬂict-
preemption doctrine to see whether, both facially and as-applied to MPHJ, 
the Vermont anti-patent statute survives conﬂict preemption. That section 
also determines whether the statute survives ﬁeld preemption. Finally, 
Section C applies my suggested petition-immunity test to MPHJ’s conduct 
to see whether the Petition Clause immunizes MPHJ. 
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Recall that Vermont uses a nonexhaustive multifactor balancing test to 
determine whether there’s a bad-faith assertion of patent infringement.285 
The statute provides several factors to consider as evidence of bad-faith 
assertions of patent infringement: 
 
• The demand letter lacks the patent number, the patentholder’s 
name and address, and “factual allegations concerning the speciﬁc 
areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology 
infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.”286 
• Before sending the demand letter, the patentholder “fails to 
conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the 
target’s products, services, and technology, or such an analysis was 
done but does not identify specific areas in which the products, 
services, and technology are covered by the claims in the patent.”287 
• The demand letter lacks the above information, the receiver of 
the letter requests the missing information, and “the person fails 
to provide the information within a reasonable period of time.”288 
• “The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response 
within an unreasonably short period of time.”289 
• The patentholder “offers to license the patent for an amount that 
is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.”290 
• “The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and 
the person knew, or should have known, that the claim or 
assertion is meritless.”291 
• “The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.”292 
• The patentholder or “its subsidiaries or aﬃliates have previously 
ﬁled or threatened to ﬁle one or more lawsuits based on the same 
or similar claim of patent infringement” and they lacked 
information above or in court were found to be meritless.293 
 
The statute also provides factors in considering whether a person hasn’t 
made a bad-faith assertion of patent infringement, although most are just the 
alternatives of the bad-faith factors.294 In short, Vermont instructs courts to 
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consider objective and subjective factors, but it doesn’t require both for bad 
faith. The Vermont Attorney General or a target of a demand letter can enforce 
the statute.295 The potential private remedies consist of equitable relief, 
damages, costs and fees, and treble damages or $50,000, whichever is greater.296 
A. Bottom-Feeder Patent Troll: MPHJ Technology Investments 
In September 2012, MPHJ bought from another NPE four U.S. patents 
and one pending U.S. patent application, which later issued in 2013.297 Soon 
after, MPHJ, through 81 of its subsidiaries, sent thousands of demand letters 
to thousands of small businesses throughout the United States.298 MPHJ 
targeted small businesses.299 In less than a year, MPHJ sent 16,465 letters.300 
MPHJ did this in three stages.301 
The ﬁrst demand letter alleged that the small business could be “using the 
patented technology” and expressed that the letter was meant to “initiate 
discussions regarding [the small business’s] need for a license.”302 Next, the 
letter listed the four patents and the patent application.303 The letter then 
shallowly analyzed the patents’ claims, asserting that the claims had a broad 
scope.304 MPHJ also gave a nonexhaustive list of examples of alleged 
infringing systems, and MPHJ asserted patent infringement because the 
small business “almost certainly uses in its day-to-day operations digital 
copier/scanner/multifunction equipment which is interfaced to a separate 
central oﬃce computer (an oﬃce network), so that digital images may be 
scanned and transmitted to one or more destinations such as email accounts 
and other applications.”305 If this was the case, then the target “should enter 
into a license agreement with [MPHJ].”306 The letter also suggested a “fair price” 
of $1200 per employee.307 MPHJ gave the targets two weeks to respond.308 
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In the second stage, MPHJ sent demand letters referencing the ﬁrst letter 
to over 10,000 small businesses.309 Each letter, sent on law-ﬁrm letterhead, 
said that MPHJ “reasonably assumes you have an infringing system and need 
a license” because there wasn’t a response to the ﬁrst letter.310 The letter also 
stated that although there can be litigation, MPHJ’s preference was to “make 
all reasonable eﬀorts to reach agreement on a license.”311 Again, the small 
business was given two weeks to respond.312 
In the last stage, the third letter referenced the ﬁrst two letters and stated 
that if the small business didn’t respond in two weeks, then it would be sued 
for patent infringement.313 The letter included a complaint.314 MPHJ sent the 
letter to over 4,800 small businesses.315 At that point, according to the FTC, 
MPHJ was “not prepared to initiate legal actions for infringement . . . against 
the small businesses that did not respond . . . and did not intend to promptly 
initiate such litigation.”316 Eventually, MPHJ ﬁled some lawsuits but against 
large corporations, not the small businesses they targeted with the letters.317 
B. Implied Preemption 
1. Conflict Preemption 
According to Fromer, federal patent law preempts the Vermont anti-
patent statute “on satisfaction of two conditions”: (1) the statute “lie[s] 
within the preemptive scope of the IP Clause,” and (2) the statute “upset[s] 
the IP Clause’s balance, as effectuated by a federal law.”318 
First, to determine whether the Vermont statute is within the IP 
Clause’s preemptive scope, the structural purpose of Vermont’s statute must 
be determined. This must be done by looking “both at its facial purpose and 
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its purpose as applied in the particular enforcement scenario.”319 According 
to the legislative findings and statement of purpose of Vermont’s anti-
patent statute, the statute’s purpose is “to build an entrepreneurial and 
knowledge-based economy,” and attract small- and medium-size 
companies.320 Vermont seeks to help businesses reduce the costs of resolving 
litigation, so that the funds are available to “invest, produce new products, 
expand, or hire new workers.”321 
Facially, this is within the IP Clause’s preemptive scope. Like the IP 
Clause, Vermont wants to encourage the advancement of knowledge and 
technology except with a different means—reducing the funds lost from 
litigation, so that companies can spend it on innovation, among other 
things. Even as applied to a claim from the Attorney General or a private 
party, the statute is within the IP Clause’s preemptive scope.322 For a 
claim by the Attorney General, the statute would have deterred MPHJ 
from continuing to send demand letters in bad faith, preventing small- 
and medium-sized businesses from losing money that would be spent on 
research and development. And for a target claim, damages return R&D 
money to the targeted business and serves the same function as a public 
suit by the Attorney General. Thus, the Vermont anti-patent statute 
scheme satisfies the first condition for conflict preemption both facially 
and as applied to MPHJ. 
Second, Congress’s effectuated balance must be determined. The 
“dominant premise underlying American patent and copyright laws is that 
the incentive of exclusive rights is granted to creators for a limited time to 
encourage their productions, which are valuable to society.”323 The IP 
Clause “reflects a balance between granting creators rights to create (and 
disseminate) works that are valuable to the public to consume and build on, 
but restricting them so that the public is not hurt.”324 Because congressional 
intent is important here,325 the statute giving a patentholder the right to 
provide notice, the affirmative defenses, Walker Process fraud, and the four 
factors from Bonito Boats are helpful for this analysis. 
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) gives patentholders the right to “give notice to the 
public that [their invention] is patented.”326 This can be done by marking 
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an article, by filing for infringement, or by other means like demand 
letters.327 Federal patent law also provides several affirmative defenses 
based on improper conduct by a patent owner: misuse, inequitable conduct, 
and estoppel.328 Each affirmative defense has a high standard; several 
require but-for materiality and specific intent. And unlike the Vermont 
statute, which provides equitable relief and damages, federal patent law only 
provides invalidity or unenforceability as a remedy. Congress’s effectuated 
balance, at least with enforcement, could be viewed as showing a policy that 
patentholder shouldn’t be punished for good-faith enforcement because the 
federal patent laws only punish patentholders for extremely bad-faith 
behavior. Federal patent law also appears to view the heavy punishment 
under the affirmative defenses, along with Walker Process fraud, as enough 
deterrence of bad behavior. A malleable bad-faith standard in the Vermont 
statute wouldn’t conflict with the federal patent laws’ objective to protect 
good-faith assertions of patent infringement. 
But Vermont’s anti-patent statute does potentially conflict with three of 
the four factors from Bonito Boats: to provide an incentive to inventors, to 
induce disclosure of inventions, and to unify patent law.329 
Incentive to Invent. The Vermont statute doesn’t provide patent-like 
protection, but it still can incentivize inventors. By protecting potential 
inventors from unnecessary expenses, the inventors can spend it on R&D, 
potentially creating patentable inventions. Yet the Vermont statute perhaps 
hampers the federal patent laws’ incentive to invent. Although the financial 
burdens in satisfying the Vermont statute don’t seem large, the statute gives 
an unpredictable multifactor balancing test that can severely reduce 
enforcement rights. As of now, it’s unclear which factors are necessary or 
most important.330 Some factors of the Vermont statute may be expensive, 
like a patentholder having to seek legal advice for a claim comparison. With 
the uncertainty of the law, risk-averse parties might choose not to enforce 
their patents. On the other hand, most patentholders are sophisticated 
corporations capable of navigating this landscape; small- and medium-sized 
businesses might be the only ones greatly affected. Overall, Vermont’s anti-
patent statute could be an obstacle to patent law’s incentives, but it likely only 
complements the incentive to invent. 
Incentive to Disclose. If patent rights are weakened, inventors will be 
encouraged to seek protection through trade secret law. Pushing inventors to 
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trade secret law stymies the incentive to disclose. Although in Kewanee the 
Supreme Court didn’t think that inventors would choose trade secret law over 
patent law, empirics rebut this.331 But, as noted above, sophisticated 
corporations, capable of navigating vague legal landscapes, are unlikely to be 
hindered by the anti-patent statute. It is therefore unlikely for the Vermont 
statute to discourage disclosure of inventions, at least not more than what the 
Supreme Court has already allowed with trade secrets. 
National Uniformity. Letting states regulate patent enforcement will most 
likely obstruct patent law’s national uniformity in patent enforcement. 
Because each state could have diﬀerent requirements, the transaction costs to 
learn each state’s requirements could be high. Many states, however, have 
modeled their statute on Vermont’s, reducing the potential transaction 
costs.332 And again the increased transactions costs might only heavily aﬀect 
small- and medium-sized businesses because sophisticated corporations can 
navigate diversity in the law and absorb the cost. So because the statute 
arguably complements the incentive to invent, wouldn’t burden disclosure 
more than trade secret law, and the current landscape of states wouldn’t 
fracture enforcement policies, the statute facially survives conﬂict 
preemption using Fromer’s framework. 
The same is true as applied to MPHJ. As applied to MPHJ, only the 
analysis of the incentive to invent and incentive to disclose changes. Here, 
the burdens on the patent system are even more tangential and hypothetical. 
MPHJ is an NPE, so it doesn’t invent itself. Of course, MPHJ and other 
NPEs theoretically contribute to inventing by buying the patents and thus 
ﬁnancing the original inventors. But this (theoretical) contribution is far 
outweighed by the detriment NPEs cause to the incentive to invent. 
Plus, NPEs are unlikely to resort to trade secret law because it isn’t in their 
business model. Because NPEs don’t commercialize their inventions, they don’t 
have the trade-secret-worthy know-how for licensing. So it’s unlikely that, as 
applied to MPHJ, the Vermont statute disturbs Congress’s effectuated balance. 
Thus, the Vermont statute will survive conflict preemption.333 But it must 
also survive a field-preemption and petitioning-immunity analysis. 
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2. Field Preemption 
Vermont’s statute is unlikely to be preempted under field preemption. 
Federal law invalidates state law when there’s a “scheme of federal 
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room to supplement it.”334 A scheme can be so pervasive for two 
reasons: (1) because “the federal interest is so dominant” that it 
presumptively precludes any role for state law enforcement or (2) because 
“the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of 
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.”335 
Unlike the BPCIA for biosimilar patents in Amgen, the Patent Act has 
no comprehensive scheme for enforcement. Only one statute mentions 
notice and enforcement, and there are only a few affirmative defenses. 
Because of this, Congress has thus far unsuccessfully tried to pass legislation 
to elaborate on the field, and agencies like the FTC have started to regulate 
enforcement.336 Thus, Vermont’s anti-patent statutes shouldn’t be 
invalidated through field preemption. 
C. The Rehashed Petition-Immunity Test 
My proposed two-part test for piercing petition immunity is: (1) the 
litigant’s actions were objectively unreasonable and (2) the litigant is 
“indifferent to the outcome of [potential litigation or] litigation itself, but 
has nevertheless sought to impose a collateral harm on the defendant.”337 To 
determine the objective reasonableness, Judge Posner suggests considering 
the probability of winning, the remedy, and the cost of litigation.338 Notably, 
the outcome can change based on whether the parties are competitors.339 
First, MPHJ’s actions are objectively unreasonable. Here the court 
should look to the strength of the case, the possible remedy, and cost of 
litigation. MPHJ’s suggestion that its claims covered general products 
isn’t very strong. And because MPHJ was targeting small- and medium-
size businesses without large profit margins and these businesses aren’t 
competitors, the remedy from the lawsuit doesn’t seem objectively 
 
334 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
204 (1983). 
335 Id. (cleaned up). 
336 Gugliuzza, supra note 6, at 1636-38. 
337 Prof ’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PRE), 508 U.S 49, 68 (1993) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
338 Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982),	disapproved of 
by	PRE, 508 U.S. at 65-66. 
339 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, ¶ 205b. 
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worthwhile.340 Every patent-infringement lawsuit is also extremely 
expensive with attorney’s fees only granted in exceptional 
circumstances.341 Taken together, suing these targets is unreasonable.342 
Thus, the first element is satisfied, and the court should go into the 
subjective motivation of MPHJ. 
Second, MPHJ’s actions show a subjective motivation to abuse the 
judicial system. MPHJ repetitively sent demand letters that contained 
several false or deceptive facts, asked for an unreasonable decision time, 
wasn’t prepared to bring any lawsuit, and didn’t plan on suing. There’s only 
one reasonable inference: MPHJ wanted to use the threat of the financial 
burdens of the judicial system to force quick settlements. Petition immunity 
is therefore pierced. Still, a private party or Vermont’s Attorney General 
must prove the requirements of their statute. Because the Vermont statute 
is a multifactor balancing test that’s likely a lower standard than the 
suggested test, MPHJ would be liable under the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment relies on Supreme Court implied-preemption doctrine 
and the First Amendment’s Petition Clause doctrine to show the proper 
framework for analyzing the validity of state anti-patent laws. This 
Comment also shows whether Vermont’s anti-patent laws will survive a 
proper conflict-preemption analysis, both facially and as applied to an 
infamous patent troll. And this Comment shows whether Vermont’s anti-
patent laws as applied to an infamous patent troll could satisfy a proper 
petition-immunity analysis. This framework suggests that many anti-patent 
laws will survive conflict preemption, but that some applications of the 
statute might not satisfy the floor of the Constitution. 
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340 One could argue that, because patent law grants a right to exclude, if MPHJ sought an 
injunction, then the demand letter wouldn’t be objectively unreasonable. This doesn’t change the 
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